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PREFACE
The essays presented here represent work on ancient philosophy with spe-
cial focus on Socrates and Plato. Most of them have been published else-
where but are hopefully still relevant and are obviously now more easily 
accessible. Others originate in papers presented in various academic fora 
and are now published for the first time. An important motivation for col-
lecting these essays is that they are focused on a few central topics and 
thus support each other in advocating interpretations that may deserve 
attention.
To make the coherence of this volume clear, the essays are grouped in 
three parts: Part I: Socrates, Part II: Plato and Part III: Later Philosophy. 
All this is introduced by a piece on Pythagorean Principles, an important 
forerunner of Platonic philosophy.
It should be noted that Part I on Socrates focuses on Socratic method, 
which has for some time been at the centre of my research. The essay 
‘Socrates’ Argumentative Strategy’ (originally published in Classica et 
Mediaevalia) is here a centrepiece in that it seeks to collect evidence from 
all so-called Socratic dialogues to form a picture of the argumentation 
offered. This is very much a live topic today.
Part II has the following three focuses: the Republic, the Timaeus and 
psychology. The first deals with happiness, health and the good life; while 
the second deals with ontological questions and the third with various is-
sues in Platonic psychology. I advocate an ‘Aristotelian’ view of the soul as 
necessarily embodied in the late dialogues generally. In my understand-
ing even god (mind) needs a body (e.g., in the Politicus). A fourth focus is 
on Plato’s development and on how to read Plato, again a hotly discussed 
subject.
Part III has one paper on Aristotle’s conception of the good life and 
another on the transformation of Stoicism by Panaetius and Posidonius. 
They give us a new philosophy of man and psycho-pathology, and an im-
mense trust in theoretical and practical reason controlled by ob servation 
of fact.
The essays composing the present volume all originate from the time I 
spent working in the Classics Department at Aarhus University, to which 
I owe thanks for allowing me to travel, research and teach this subject 
over the years. I am also indebted to colleagues in Scandinavia, the UK 
(Oxford and Cambridge) and the USA (Austin), and generally to members 
of the International Plato Society and to many students both in Denmark 
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and abroad who have been exposed to my views contained in these essays. 
I hope it is apparent that I have benefited from their reactions. However, 
needless to say, I am the only one responsible. Finally, I would like to 
express my gratitude to Marianne Gulstad Pedersen, Publizon A/S, who 
with great technical skill has made this publication possible. My final and 
warmest thanks go to my wife Gudrun for patience and caring support.
E.O. Aarhus, February 2016
HumanWisdom_book_250416.indd   8 4/25/2016   4:20:33 PM
  9
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
‘Socratic Argument Strategies and Aristotle’s Topics’, Méthexis (Revista 
Argentina de Filosofia Antigua), ix, 1996, 43-57. Reprinted with kind 
permission from Academia Verlag.
‘Socrates’ Argumentative Strategy’, Classica et Mediaevalia 59, 2008, 41-
98. Reprinted with kind permission from Museum Tusculanum Press.
‘Hypothetical Method in the Charmides and in the Elenchus’, Classica 
et Mediaevalia 50, 1999, 67-80. Reprinted with kind permission from 
Museum Tusculanum Press.
‘The Socratic Elenchus Reconsidered-Once More’, For Particular Reasons 
(Studies in Honour of Jerker Blomqvist), Lund 2003, 231-245. Reprinted 
with kind permission from Nordic Academic Press. 
‘The Foundation of Socratic Morality’, Méthexis (Revista Argentina de 
Filosofia Antigua), iv, 1991, 5-18. Reprinted with kind permission from 
Academia Verlag.
‘The Meaning and Justification of a Paradox’, Gorgias-Meno (M. Erler and 
L. Brisson eds.), Int. Plato Studies 25, Sankt Augustin 2007, 108-115. 
Reprinted with kind permission from Academia Verlag.
‘Eudaimonia in Plato’s Republic’, Essays on Plato’s Republic (ed. Erik Nis 
Ostenfeld), Aarhus 1998, 73-84. Reprinted with kind permission from 
Aarhus University Press.
‘The Place and Justification of the Good and of Social Justice in the 
Good Life of Plato’s Republic’, Platonic Political Philosophy I (ed. K. J. 
Boudouris), Athens 1997, 123-133. Reprinted with kind permission 
from The International Centre of Greek Philosophy and Culture.
‘Self-motion, Tripartition and Embodiment’, Classica et Mediaevalia 41, 
1990, 43-49. Reprinted with kind permission from Museum Tuscula-
num Press.
‘The Role and Status of the Forms in the Timaeus: Paradeigmatism revi-
sited?’, Interpreting the Timaeus-Critias (T. Calvo and L. Brisson eds.), 
Int. Plato Studies 9, Sankt Augustin 1997, 167-177. Reprinted with 
kind permission from Academia Verlag.
‘Disorderly Motion in the Timaeus’, Classica et Mediaevalia 29, 1968, 22-
26. Reprinted with kind permission from Museum Tusculanum Press.
‘Plato’s Concept of Matter’, Classica et Mediaevalia, Dissertationes ix, 1973, 
47-67. Reprinted with kind permission from Museum Tusculanum 
Press.
HumanWisdom_book_250416.indd   9 4/25/2016   4:20:33 PM
10 Acknowledgements
‘The Physicality of God in the Politicus Myth and in the later Dialogues’, 
Classica et Mediaevalia 44, 1993, 97-108. Reprinted with kind permis-
sion from Museum Tusculanum Press.
‘The Psychology of the Philebus’, Plato’s Philebus (J. Dillon and L. Brisson 
eds.), Int. Plato Studies 26, Sankt Augustin 2010, 307-312. Reprinted 
with kind permission from Academia Verlag.
‘Plato’s Development and the Date of the Timaeus’, Classica et Mediaevalia 
37, 1986, 63-87. Reprinted with kind permission from Museum Tuscula-
num Press.
‘Mental Health in Socrates and Plato’, Philosophy and Medicine II (K. J. 
Boudouris ed.), Athens 1998, 151-163. Reprinted with kind permission 
from The International Centre of Greek Philosophy and Culture.
‘Who Speaks for Plato? Everyone!’, Who Speaks for Plato?, Studies in 
Platonic Anonymity (G. Press ed.), Lanham 2000, 211-219. Reprinted 
with kind permission from Rowman and Littlefield.
‘Early Pythagorean Principles: Peras and Apeiron’, Ionian Philosophy (K.  J. 
Boudouris ed.), Athens 1989, 304-311. Reprinted with kind permission 
from The International Centre of Greek Philosophy and Culture.
‘Aristotle on the Good Life and Quality of Life’, Concepts and Measurement 
of Quality of Life In Health Care (L. Nordenfelt ed.), Philosophy and 
Medicine 47, Dordrecht 1994, 19-34, Reprinted with kind permission 
from Springer Science and Business Media.
Note: Permission has kindly been given to reprint the essays listed above 
with minor corrections.
HumanWisdom_book_250416.indd   10 4/25/2016   4:20:33 PM
  11
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Aristoteles
An. Pr. Analytica Priora
An. Post. Analytica Posteriora
Top. Topica
SE Sophistici Elenchi
Phys. Physica
Cael. De Caelo
Met. Metaphysica
EN Ethica Nicomachea
EE Ethica Eudemia
MM Magna Moralia
DA/De An. De Anima
Plato
Alc. Alcibiades
Ap./Apol. Apologia
Ch./Chrm./Charm. Charmides 
Crat. Cratylus
Cr. /Cri./Crit. Crito
Criti. Critias
Epist. Epistula
Epin. Epinomis
Eu./ Euphr./Euthyph. Euthyphro
Eud. / Euthyd. Euthydemus
G./Grg./Gorg. Gorgias
H. Ma./H. Maj. Hippias Major
H.Mi./H.Min. Hippias Minor
La./Lach. Laches
Lg./Leg. Leges
Ly./Lys. Lysis
M./Men. Meno
Menex. Menexenus
Parm. Parmenides
Phd. Phaedo
Phdr. Phaedrus
Phil. Philebus
Pol./Polit. Politicus
HumanWisdom_book_250416.indd   11 4/25/2016   4:20:33 PM
12 List of Abbreviations
Pr./Prt./Prot. Protagoras
Rep. Respublica
Smp./Symp. Symposium
Sph./Soph. Sophista
Tht. Theaetetus
Ti. /Tim. Timaeus
Galenus
De Placit. De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis
Philo
De Aet. Mundi De Aeternitate Mundi
Proclus
In Tim. In Platonis Timaeum
Simplicius
In DC In libros Aristotelis De Caelo
Stobaeus 
Ecl. Eclogae, Joannis Stobaei Anthologii libri, 
I-V (C. Wachsmuth/ O. Hense eds.), 
Berlin 1884-1912 
 
Xenophon
Mem. Memorabilia
Cicero
Div. De Divinatione
Nat.D. De Natura Deorum
Fin. De Finibus
Leg. De Legibus
Off. De Officiis
Rep. De Republica
Tusc. Tusculanae Disputationes
Seneca
Ep. Epistula
HumanWisdom_book_250416.indd   12 4/25/2016   4:20:33 PM
List of Abbreviations 13
Journals
AGPh Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophy
AJP/AJPh American Journal of Philology
Cl.Phil. Classical Philology
Class.&Med./C&M Classica et Mediaevalia
CQ Classical Quarterly
CR Classical Review
JHS Journal of Hellenic Studies
Journ.Royal Stat. Soc. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society
OSAP Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
PASS Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Suppl. vol.
PCPhS Proceedings of Cambridge Philological 
Society
Phron Phronesis
PQ Philosophical Quarterly
PR Philosophical Review
Rev Met  Review of Metaphysics
Rh M Rheinisches Museum
Books
DK H. Diels-W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker I-III, Zürich 
196612
FMM Erik Nis Ostenfeld, Forms, Matter and Mind. Three Strands in 
Pla to’s Metaphysics, The Hague 1982
RE Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll , Real-Encyclopaedie d. klassischen Alter tum-
wissen schaft (1893-)
SVF Hans von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (1903-)
HumanWisdom_book_250416.indd   13 4/25/2016   4:20:33 PM
14  
INTRODUCTION
The present volume contains a selection of papers on ancient philosophy 
presented in various settings, mostly published elsewhere, but some not 
published before. Chronologically they span from 1968 to the present day. 
Included are articles that have been collected from a variety of sources: 
journals, conference proceedings, a Festschrift, monographs and a scien-
tific series. The majority of these articles are difficult to locate in their 
original publications, so the present book is designed to facilitate their ac-
cess. But, perhaps more importantly, it is designed to bring together the-
matically complementary articles that form a united body of research and 
provide a deeper insight into the topics discussed. The contributions fall 
roughly into three main groups: Socrates, Plato and later philosophy (in-
cluding Aristotle and the Stoics), all of which reflect the author’s lifelong 
interest and which may have something to offer to the ongoing debate. 
The collection is headed by an article focusing on the ontology of an earlier 
period (the Pythagoreans) with some repercussions in later thought and of 
general philosophical interest.
The papers on Socrates focus a good deal on the formal aspect of 
Socratic philosophy, Socratic methodology and its outcome: truth or the 
preparation for truth. Two papers deal with more substantial topics such 
as the foundation of morality and a central Socratic paradox.
The papers on Plato fall into four groups. One cluster discusses themes 
relating to the Republic: the Good and social justice, psychotherapy, hap-
piness (eudaimonia) and mental health. Another cluster of three papers 
deals with the influential Timaeus from various viewpoints: the Forms, 
matter and motion. Then follow three papers that share the view that soul 
is necessarily embodied: self-motion in the Phaedrus, God in the Politicus 
and the psychology of the Philebus, plus a piece on self-control in the Laws. 
The Plato part ends with two papers on Plato’s development and his late 
philosophy in the light of the Epinomis (which is argued to be genuine) 
and a tailpiece on the formal and much debated subject of how to read 
Plato in ‘Who speaks for Plato?’.
Part III consists of two papers on post-Platonic philosophy: Aristotle 
on the good life and the transformation of Stoicism by Panaetius and 
Posidonius.
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Prelude: A first approximation to the abstract 
Early Pythagorean Principles: Peras and Apeiron
It is commonly assumed that the Pythagoreans, the Italian school of 
philosophy, advocated and introduced a philosophy of form or structure 
in contrast to earlier Ionian philosophy of matter. Such form-matter op-
position presumably reflects a distinction similar to that suggested by 
the Aristotelian form/matter distinction. Judging from the best extant 
evidence, Aristotle’s report in Metaphysics A, it appears that (a) the 
Pythagoreans are regarded as different from the phusiologoi owing to their 
use of stranger elements: non-sensible, immovable, mathematical objects. 
However, (b) they agree with the physical philosophers that the real is 
simply all that is perceptible. So Plato complains that the Pythagoreans 
are too empirical (Rep. 531c).
So how are these Pythagorean principles to be conceived? One might 
think that being the elements of number they would be fairly abstract en-
tities. However, numbers, being identical with things themselves, are not 
abstract; and looking through his own spectacles of form/matter, Aristotle 
concludes that the different Pythagorean principles seem to have been 
ranged under the head of matter: ‘for out of these as immanent parts they 
say substance is composed and moulded’. However, in contrast to the ear-
lier materialists the two principles of finitude (peperasmenon) and unlim-
ited are not certain other natures (phuseis) like fire, earth, etc., but are 
themselves the substance (ousia) of the things of which they (sc. the one 
(or finitude) and unlimited) are predicated (Met.987al5-19). The follow-
ing conclusion can be drawn: we are dealing not with a form/matter du-
alism in the Aristotelian sense, but with something far more primitive: 
the primeval unit (with magnitude) breathes and imposes order on the 
unlimited. But also something ‘modern’: Pythagorean opposites are of an-
other, wider and more abstract order than Ionian opposites, and they are 
notably value-laden. Hence, when Aristotle seems to think, uneasily, that 
we are still within the confines of materiality, he is not quite right. And 
when he mentions unlimited only as matter, he may be interpreting the 
Pythagoreans in Platonic terms.
More precisely, Pythagorean numbers may have been conceived of as 
extended (with magnitude) but without corporeality: matter and geomet-
rical structure coincide, in spite of Aristotle’s protests. Cf. Melissos’ One 
which is extended (frg.3) but without body (frg.9), Plato’s elementary ge-
ometrical configurations in space, Descartes’ matter which is extension 
only, and in modern times, perhaps, Einstein’s and Heisenberg’s notion 
of fields in space. Aristotle cannot accept the notion of an extended but 
incorporeal self-subsistent substance. This accounts for his unsuccessful 
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attempts to fit the Pythagoreans into his own metaphysical framework. 
Is it then a philosophy of form we have been considering, or is it rather 
one of matter? The answer is that the question is anachronistic. Put in 
Aristotelian terms, it is both too modern (later in time) and too prim-
itive. Recent developments in physics appear to have transcended the 
Aristotelian dichotomy, and physicists are now concerned with a mathe-
matical conception of reality that might have raised the interest or even 
enthusiasm of the ancient Pythagoreans.
Part I: Socrates 
Method
One way to get an idea of what Socrates was up to by way of method is to 
take a look at Aristotle’s manuals of dialectic and then turn to the early 
dialogues of Plato to identify the strategy of Socratic conversation. This 
procedure helps one to spot the sophistic Socrates in particular. Hence it 
is tempting to see him (with Aristotle) as merely refuting people, not offer-
ing any truths himself. However, on the basis of a full registration of the 
arguments to be found in the early dialogues, the following more nuanced 
results have been reached:
(A) We have found that G. Vlastos must be corrected on several im-
portant points and that R. Robinson was much more right than his later 
critics have realised: Firstly, a closer and more systematic examination 
of the dialogues confirms that the overwhelming amount of refutation is 
indirect (more than twice the number of direct refutations, 50:21). Hence, 
Vlastos’ critique that Robinson’s indirect elenchus is ‘not in the texts’ is 
unwarranted. Secondly, it is notable that indirect refutation is used main-
ly to refute definitions of moral terms, whereas direct refutation focuses 
largely on other positive moral theses (e.g., ‘listen to experts in morals’, ‘the 
deliberatively criminal is the only good person’, ‘it is worse to do wrong’, 
‘correction is better than licence’, ‘the beautiful is identical with the good’). 
However, there is no warrant for claiming that Socrates does not occasion-
ally use indirect argument too for establishing moral theses (‘justice is 
holiness’, ‘temperance is wisdom’, ‘might is not right’, ‘a life of pleasure is 
not attractive and not the good’). This relates to the question of Socrates’ 
commitment to the arguments and the minor premises. So thirdly, contra-
ry to what Vlastos thinks, there is a clear dependence on endoxa in direct 
refutation and in what I call ‘Extended Reductio’. Vlastos claims that the 
indirect arguments rely on external premises, whereas our analyses show 
that of 45 indirect refutations 34 are conducted without such support 
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(‘Basic Reductio’). Fourthly, we have noted a methodological development 
from hypothesis in elenchus to elenchus in hypothesis. 1
(B) We have also countered the prevalent rather despairing attitude 
as to finding a consistent method in Socrates’ argumentation with a 
demonstration that we have at least four logically distinct patterns in the 
texts that deserve the title elenchus. Hence what has been offered is an 
empirically more well-founded picture of Socrates’ procedure in his con-
versations. At the same time, this is a defence of R. Robinson against the 
still dominant influence of G. Vlastos as well as being a counter-argument 
against the recent scepticism of, e.g., Brickhouse/Smith.
1. Socratic argumentation strategies and Aristotle’s Topics and Sophis tic al 
Refutations
The object of this essay is an examination of the Socratic elenctic meth-
od as it is practised in the so-called aporetic dialogues, that is, Hippias 
Major, Hippias Minor, Laches, Lysis, Charmides, Euthyphro, Republic 
I and Protagoras and, with certain reservations, Gorgias, Euthydemus 
and Meno. The Apology and the Crito are relevant too. Apart from the 
Platonic evidence we get valuable information about dialogic projects in 
the orators, fragments and testimonia of sophists, the double speeches of 
Thucydides, Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Isocrates’ Against the Sophists and 
Helena and Aristotle’s Topics and Sophistical Refutations.
A number of questions are raised: What is a Socratic elenchus? A ra-
tional and valid persuasion, a method of education, or a method of investi-
gation? Was there more than one type of elenchus? What did it consist of? 
What was an aporia? What was the historical background of the elenchus? 
What was its potential? Could it provide knowledge or truth, or just prove 
something? What was the relation to other philosophical methods such as 
hypothetical method or dialectic? What kind of rationality is involved? Is 
reason really autonomous in the elenchus (going wherever the logos leads 
us)? How far is it a matter of rhetorical tricks? Who benefited from the 
elenchus? Did Socrates ever doubt his own method? Did Plato? 
The strategy will be to discuss the form and function of the elenchus 
by looking first (heuristically) at the Aristotelian handbooks of dialectic 
to get an idea of what to look for with profit in the Socratic dialogues, 
and then to look at these dialogues themselves, with an occasional glance 
at other sources. It is of course always methodologically suspect to ‘read 
backwards’, i.e., to impute later insight to an earlier author. However, I 
1 The technical terms are explained in ch. 3 below, the most thorough study of the 
elenchus.
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hope to have guarded against this by describing and intending the read-
ing of Aristotle as ‘heuristic’. The findings must be judged on their own.
An important by-product of the examination is to seek to isolate a 
double picture of a true historical Socrates and a heroic Platonic Socrates 
in the early dialogues. Socrates is depicted by Plato both as different from 
the sophists in both method and aim, and also as sophistic and even as a 
sophist (this is certainly how he is looked at by some of those who got in 
contact with him).
One can find the sophistic Socrates especially in Hippias Minor, 
Charmides and Republic I, while the heroic Socrates is most conspicuous 
in the Apology, Crito, Euthydemus, Gorgias and the Meno. Traditionally, 
most or all of the emphasis has been laid on the heroic Socrates. The aim 
of this essay is to redress the balance by focusing on another Socrates ev-
ident in his actual behaviour and the reactions it evoked in the dialogues.
2. Direct and indirect argumentation in the Socratic elenchus
Since Richard Robinson’s studies on Socratic dialectic half a century ago, 
it has been realised that Socrates uses two forms of refutation, direct and 
indirect. Robinson counted the elenchi of the early dialogues (unfortunate-
ly without giving the references) and found that 2/3 of the elenchi were 
indirect. In that light, it was surprising that Vlastos focused on direct 
elenchus as the ‘standard elenchus’. His reason was that indirect elenchus 
could only show inconsistency, not prove truth. But this seems incorrect 
and assumes that Socrates’ first aim was to prove truth (which is debata-
ble as a general claim). A consequence of this assumption was that Vlastos 
was unnecessarily, and I would argue wrongly, against identifying the 
additional premises of the elenchus as reputable beliefs. He was afraid of 
Socratic ethics being grounded on common moral notions.
I argue here that this fear is ungrounded. Apart from the special case 
of the Gorgias, there is no direct proof of truth, only of falsity in the elen-
chus, even in the direct elenchus. The elenchus is basically refutation of 
a person out of his own mouth, by Socrates. Hence the premises of that 
refutation are part of the belief system of the interrogated person, not of 
the interrogator. So we do not need to inquire whether Socrates happened 
to believe in all or some of the external or additional premises (i.e., other 
than the refutandum) of his various elenchi. In fact, he may or may not ac-
cept such premises, but it is not relevant whether he does. What is relevant 
is that these external premises are more fundamental (to the interlocutor) 
than the refutandum and are therefore preferred to the refutandum when 
inconsistency appears. An examination of these premises reveals that 
they extend from truisms via generally believed moral propositions (e.g. 
sophrosune is fine and good) and metaphysical principles (e.g. of function, 
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capacity, etc.) to sometimes trivial empirical truths. Most of them seem to 
have the status of Aristotelian endoxa that commend themselves to all or 
to the majority or to the wise (cf. Top. 100b22ff.) i.e., self-evident proposi-
tions, or insights of various groups of people. But even with a self-evident 
premise no proof is forthcoming.
In addition, direct and indirect elenchi do not reveal any significant 
difference as regards the choice of such premises. A consequence is that 
the much discussed ‘puzzle of the elenchus’ (i.e. how can Socrates think he 
gets truth when all he can claim is consistency?) seems illusory. I’m not 
arguing of course that Socrates is not interested in truth at the end. It is 
just not the direct result of the individual elenchus.
In the second part of my contribution I show that it is misleading to 
baptize one of the two forms of elenchus as ‘standard’. There seems to be no 
significant difference in their importance and use. Thus it is not the case 
that the indirect elenchus is used just as a kind of preliminary treatment 
to ‘rough up’ the interlocutor.
3. Socrates’ argumentative strategy
The literature on Socratic argumentation has been dominated by gen-
eralisations about the strategy of a Socratic conversation (Robinson 
and Vlastos have led the way, in different directions) or, at the other ex-
treme, recently by total despair with regard to finding a unitary pattern 
(Polansky, Brickhouse and Smith). In this essay an attempt is made to 
give a more well-founded picture of Socratic argumentation than I be-
lieve has been offered so far. This is done by a systematic examination of 
the arguments found in the so-called early dialogues. Briefly the results 
demonstrate that (1) the overwhelming amount of refutation is indirect (R. 
Robinson was right and Vlastos wrong); (2) indirect refutation is mainly 
used to refute definitions of moral terms, whereas direct refutation is used 
on other (positive) moral theses. This does not preclude indirect refuta-
tion too from being occasionally used for indirectly establishing important 
moral theses; (3) more than half of the indirect refutations are conducted 
without the support of external premises (‘basic reductio’); (4) there is a 
reliance on endoxa in both direct and indirect refutation (‘extended reduc-
tio’); (5) there is a methodological development from hypothesis in elenchus 
to elenchus in hypothesis; and (6) we find four distinct patterns of elenctic 
argument in the texts, three indirect and one direct. Hence a defence is 
presented of Robinson against the influential Vlastos and also a coun-
ter-argument against the recent scepticism of, e.g., Brickhouse/Smith. 
It may seem that the view of the elenchus in this chapter and in chap-
ter 4 below is incompatible with the rather deconstructive view offered in 
chapters 1 and 2 above. However, this depends to some extent on differ-
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ence in focus: in chapters 1 and 2 the focus is very much on the missing va-
lidity of the arguments of the sophistic Socrates and the direct outcome of 
such arguments. In addition, focusing on arguments in, e.g., the Gorgias 
may give the impression of a more positive elenchus, reflecting a more con-
structive use of the elenchus there.
4. The Socratic elenchus reconsidered – once more
Here my aim is to reopen the debate about the fundamental issue of the 
identification of the method pursued by Socrates in the early dialogues, 
by which I shall understand the Apology, Crito, Charmides, Euthyphro, 
Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Protagoras, Euthydemus, Hippias 
Major, Lysis, Menexenus and Republic I.
I do not deal more than necessary with related questions of what 
Socrates believes he establishes, how he thinks he establishes it and 
whether he is justified in so believing, i.e. the validity of his arguments. 
However, I do intend to add some considerations on the status of the prem-
ises and the scope or goal of the elenchus, thereby entering the much de-
bated question of the possibly constructive function of the elenchus.
In recent work on Socratic method it has too often been assumed that 
just one method was to be found in the dialogues. However, there may well 
be not one method but several methods at work. Even the elenchus itself 
should not initially be taken as one single method. Hence we must beware 
of a tendency towards unwarranted oversimplification in talking of the 
elenchus. Finally, we should be prepared for the fact that distinctions we 
find in method were not recognised by Plato.
I look first at two milestones in the literature about Socratic dialec-
tic, Richard Robinson and Gregory Vlastos, and then having evaluated 
their contributions turn to a renewed consideration of the texts, in the 
light of previous insights. This is done in two steps, first a glance at the 
wider strategy of the elenchus, then a closer look at some selected elenchi. 
Finally I look at the results of the elenchus.
Can we conclude that the elenchus is an instrument in the search for 
truth? In other words, that it has a constructive side to it? There is no 
doubt that the elenchus is a method of clarification of moral matters: it 
tests moral definitions and typically finds them wanting. However, direct 
elenchus can also be used constructively to ‘prove’ moral truths such as the 
surely Socratic theses that it is worse to commit injustice than to suffer 
it, that injustice is the greatest evil. So the direct refutations at any rate 
can lead to positive results. What about the indirect refutations? Can they 
contribute in any positive way to moral elucidation? Again the answer 
seems Yes. It is important and an advance in knowledge to realise that 
pleasure and the good are not identical, that sophrosune is not just quiet, 
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that courage is not just endurance, etc. This ‘negative knowledge’ is of 
course less definite than the positive knowledge just mentioned, but its 
value is increased as the number of negations increases. 
To summarise: I argue that Robinson and Vlastos both have their 
strengths and weaknesses and that a correct model of the elenchus should 
take seriously its double nature. Next, I emphasise the prevalence of indi-
rect refutation and show the distribution among the dialogues and in some 
dialogues of the use of the two types of refutation. Third, I offer a model 
of the indirect refutation as a reductio that combines elements from both 
Robinson and Vlastos and an understanding of the external or additional 
premises of refutation that allows us to interpret them as common opin-
ions and still as Socratic. Finally, I offer some reason for thinking that the 
outcome of all types of elenchus may on occasion be constructive and thus 
a way to achieve insight. 
5. Hypothetical method in the Charmides 
The strategy of the Charmides is to advance painstakingly from defini-
tions of morality as ‘quietness’ and ‘modesty’ via ‘doing one’s own things’ 
and ‘doing good things’ to ‘knowing oneself’ and ‘knowledge of knowledge 
and oneself’. This procedure involves not only the usual analogies of vari-
ous (sometimes dubious) qualities, established by induction, and other so-
phistic manoeuvres, but also so-called hypotheses. Not only hypotheses in 
the sense of suggested definitions, but also in the Meno sense, i.e., of pro-
visional assumptions from which one can answer difficult questions. Thus 
in the Charmides the difficult question of whether morality understood as 
science of science will be of any use is answered on the assumption that 
it is possible (169d,171d and 172c). At the end of the dialogue and after 
exploring the consequences of that hypothesis, Socrates evaluates the pro-
cedure, criticising (1) the hypothesis itself and also (2) an explication of 
it, i.e., that such a science knows the tasks of other sciences: they do ‘not 
follow from our logos’ (175b5). 
I argue that this is a case of hypothetical method comparable to what 
goes on in Meno 86eff and Phaedo 100aff.: (1) we need an assumption 
about the possibility (or existence or nature) of x in order to deal ade-
quately with a question about a quality of x, (2) we must accept only what 
follows from (or agrees with) the hypothesis, (3) there is a need for deriving 
the hypothesis itself from the logos (or a higher hypothesis), and (4) the 
consequences of the hypothesis may lead to its rejection.
In the second part of the paper I explore the possibility of finding a 
coherent and perhaps unified view of hypothesis in the dialogue. We have 
other acknowledged (by Socrates) occurrences of hypothesis in the dia-
logue, notably the endoxon that ‘sophrosune is fine’ (162d2) and the third 
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definition of sophrosune: ‘minding one’s own’ (163a7). Such uses are in-
stantiated in other early dialogues.
Thus in the Euthyphro 9d8 the definition of the pious as ‘what all the 
gods love’ is introduced as a hypothesis, and at 11b6ff. Euthyphro com-
plains that all proposals (i.e. definitions), which Socrates calls ‘your hy-
potheses’ (c5), run away, like statues of Daedalus, as Socrates implies. And 
he helps Euthyphro by suggesting a higher hypothesis from which the next 
definition can evolve. This situation is echoed in part verbatim in the Meno 
97d6ff., where Meno too is in an aporia because his hypothesis (‘virtue is 
knowledge’ 89d) is running away because it is not tied down with an ar-
gument (logismos).
The procedure of the Charmides with its string of definitions displays 
an increase of insight as still higher hypotheses are tried out. Xenophon 
tells us that Socrates used to refer the argument back to hypotheses, thus 
making ‘truth’ apparent to his opponents too (Mem. IV. 6.13-15). I con-
clude that (1) the occurrences of hypothesis in the Charmides are not too 
different to be of one type, and (2) the hypothetical method found in the 
Meno and the Phaedo (without ontological implications) has significant 
parallels in the Charmides. 
Morality
The fundamental question for Socrates is relating virtue to happiness and 
moral badness to unhappiness. Is virtue an extrinsic good, a mere instru-
ment to use in obtaining happiness? Or is it an intrinsic good, either iden-
tical with happiness or a (the most important) constituent of happiness 
(still a necessary and sufficient condition of happiness)? Or is virtue not at 
all a sufficient condition, but only a necessary condition, conducive to hap-
piness? The answer is that virtue is a necessary and sufficient condition 
of happiness and that conversely immorality is a necessary and sufficient 
condition of being unhappy. As a consequence, treating other people badly 
is sure to make you unhappy because it is not in your deepest interest. 
Morality then is enlightened self-interest. But the egocentricity is softened 
by the realisation that the good of the individual coincides with the good 
of society.
The paradox that ‘wrongdoing is involuntary’ is to be understood in 
this context of self-interest. We do not want to do harmful things (all in-
dividuals pursue good things for themselves), but (importantly) among 
harmful things are morally bad things, hence we do not want to do im-
moral things.
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6. The foundation of Socratic morality
Bernard Williams has put the question that ‘we must ask why, if bodily 
hurt is no real harm, bodily hurt is what virtue so strongly requires one 
not to inflict on others?’ This raises the question of whether Socrates is 
in fact condemning specifically physical hurt. I suggest two answers on 
Socrates’ behalf: because the victim’s body and then his soul is harmed 
and that cannot be done by a good man, and because the agent’s own soul 
is destroyed by unhappiness. Hence I suggest a model that may be help-
ful in understanding the workings of injustice (immorality) according to 
Socrates. Secondly, I discuss, first, (a) the implications and interrelations 
of the terms adikein and blaptein, and next (b) the self-destruction and 
degrees of unhappiness consequent upon unjust behaviour. By this I hope 
to cast some light on the foundation of Socrates’ moral philosophy. 
How more precisely is virtue then related to happiness (and badness 
to unhappiness)? Is virtue an extrinsic good, a mere instrument to use in 
obtaining happiness? Or is it an intrinsic good, either identical with hap-
piness or a (the most important) constituent of happiness (still a necessary 
and sufficient condition of happiness)? Or is virtue not at all a sufficient 
condition, but only a necessary condition, conducive to happiness? 
The Charmides is informative here. Thus temperance is most beauti-
ful and therefore useful and a great good, the possession of which means 
happiness (175e). To live with knowledge of good and evil makes (poieî) 
one live well (eû práttein) and be happy. These references seem to indicate 
a causal and instrumental relation between morality and happiness. We 
have evidence from, e.g., the Gorgias (507b8-c7), where it is made clear 
that the virtuous is necessarily happy and the vicious necessarily unhap-
py. Hence to be virtuous is a sufficient and necessary condition for being 
happy. The fact that it is a sufficient condition is also confirmed, if we 
understand the implication of Socrates’ message that virtue does not come 
from possessions, etc., but from virtue come possessions and the other 
goods (Ap. 30b2-4). Obviously, to become good and wise is the greatest 
good for man (cf. Ap. 38a) and is necessary to deriving any benefit from 
ordinary goods. So virtue is logically both a necessary and a sufficient 
condition for being happy. Hence being immoral is certain to make you 
unhappy and thus Socrates was right to warn against being unjust: it is 
worse for the agent.
It may be asked how injuring other people could be avoided, if one has 
to do one’s duty as a citizen of Athens, participating in its wars and serv-
ing as a juror, penalising people for their offences. The answer here must 
be that the penalty must be just, and serving as a juror is just behaviour 
(though Socrates says that it is not his top priority: killing justly is neither 
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pitiable nor enviable). We may assume that he would take a similar stand 
on wars he had to fight on behalf of his city-state.
By way of conclusion, we can say that morality as such (the good) de-
mands that one does not in any way injure any other person. That is, you 
cannot possibly be morally good in any acceptable sense and still treat 
someone else badly. This is how Socrates understands morality. But why 
then be moral? Because self-interest (my good and my happiness) requires 
that I do not in any way injure any other person. The foundation of Socratic 
morality is then in the first instance enlightened self-interest: to be good 
is my deepest interest. However, it is recognised that behind my deepest 
and most real interest lies the Good which is common to all and thus the 
reason why my interest does not conflict with but rather coincides with the 
interests of other people.
7. The meaning, implications and justification of a paradox: wrongdoing 
is involuntary (the refutation of Polus)
Answers are sought to two main questions: (1) The controversial issue 
of how Socrates (Plato) thinks, or how, in fact, the paradox that ‘wrong-
doing is involuntary’ is derived, if at all, in the Gorgias. For instance, is 
the paradox derived solely from the ‘power argument’ (G. 466b-468e), or 
is it perhaps not derived at all from such an argument? Are other theses 
or perhaps paradoxes involved? (2) Is the paradox seen as or in fact es-
tablished? To answer these questions we need to probe deeper: (3) What 
role is played by the argument against the power of orators, and by its 
thesis that all men desire the good? (4) What role, if any, is played by 
other Socratic paradoxes, e.g., Virtue is Knowledge, Wrongdoing is Worse 
than Suffering? And still more fundamentally, (5) what is the desire and 
knowledge involved in virtue and by implication in vice and wrong-doing?
I suspect that I offer what is in some respects a new analysis of the 
power argument (Gorgias 466b-468e) that gives us a sound and valid ar-
gument for the possibility of lack of power and desire satisfaction in orators 
and tyrants. I stress the hypothetical nature of the conclusion, because it 
is less counterintuitive than the traditional understanding of the text. An 
important sub-conclusion of the proof is the paradoxical thesis that ‘no 
one does harmful things voluntarily’ (468a-c). An important premise is 
that ‘all men have a desire for their own good’, ‘good’ here meaning ‘useful 
for the agent’, and that ‘all human action is motivated by this desire’ (a 
paradox): all desire is ‘good-dependent’ and desire is coupled with real (not 
apparent) good. 
The other necessary ingredient in virtue, apart from desire, is power 
and expertise. As could be expected, the power argument has an impor-
tant implication here: power is an ability to do as you want, i.e. achieve 
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your own good. Hence power is good for you. Expertise (techne) seems to 
be used much in the same sense. This power/expertise/knowledge that 
is virtue (a paradox) is implied in the power argument to be knowledge 
of one’s own good. When added to or informing our natural desire for our 
good, we get not exactly virtue but success. 
However, I derive the moral paradox that ‘no one does wrong voluntar-
ily’ from the other two paradoxes: that ‘all men seek what in fact and truly 
benefits them’ and, importantly, that ‘justice benefits them (and injustice 
is harmful)’. No more premises are needed. 
Part II: Plato
The Republic
To Plato in the Republic, health is generally self-control and illness is 
immoral. So health is basically mental. He reverses the old adage mens 
sana in corpore sano to corpus sanum in mente sana. Temperance produces 
bodily well-being or at any rate makes the best of it. And temperance is a 
state of mental harmony and balance. This is health and happiness.
If the individual good life is mental health, what is then its relation to 
the social order? And vice versa, how is social order related to individual 
happiness? In other words, does the individual thrive in a well-ordered 
state, and is that state dependent on thriving individuals? In Plato’s view 
individual and state ought to be truly integrated, which implies a true 
integration of individual and social justice. 
Individual justice (morality), however, means different things in the 
different classes of the ideal state: only the ruling philosophers have full 
knowledge of the Good and are fully happy. But they are consequently 
capable of organising society in a way that transmits some opinion and 
guidelines to the lower classes, thus granting them some part in morality 
(courage and temperance respectively) and happiness. 
Mental health/illness is, however, differently conceived in different 
parts of the Corpus. In the early aporetic dialogues mental illness is a 
matter of ignorance. Later in the Republic it is seen as an imbalance (to 
be treated with education including gymnastic and music), while the 
late-Platonic view is that mental derangement is psycho-somatic (treated 
with social conditioning and medication). 
1. The place and justification of social justice in the good life in Plato’s 
Republic – Or: Why does the philosopher return into the Cave?
This paper addresses not a general question about social or political jus-
tice, but the more specific one about its relation to the good life. This re-
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quires that a number of other questions be answered: What (briefly) is 
social justice? What is private justice? How is social justice related to 
private justice? Has the problem of how to live best any connection with 
how society is best organised? Is man in general or the philosopher in 
particular, for Plato, a political animal? Are the happiness, pleasure and 
goodness of our lives (all of us or some of us) dependent on the social order? 
And if so, in what ways? The paper outlines three stages of justice found 
in the Republic: mental health – the Good – social order, in that order, and 
analyses their interrelations. This suggests answers to pressing questions 
about the status of the individual in contrast to the state and the rights 
of others.
The paper falls into two main parts, dealing with the Good and social 
order and their importance for the individual life. By way of introduction 
I briefly refer to the fact that individual justice in the Republic is mental 
health, the analogue of social justice as harmony of the classes. Then I 
look first at the point of the Good for individual life and mental health. 
Next, having examined in a transitional section the conception of reason 
to see whether philosophy and politics can be pursued by a unitary reason, 
I turn to the place and justification of social order for the individual good 
life (mental health, pleasure and welfare) and, briefly, the related ques-
tion of the importance of mental health and individual good life for social 
order, thus ending by considering the question whether individual and 
social justice are truly integrated.
2. The psychotherapeutic approach to healing in Plato (the Republic) 
In the Republic Plato tends to treat the ill as immoral, in need of education, 
and sees health as self-control or virtue (444d). He in fact reverses the old 
dictum mens sana in corpore sano to corpus sanum in mente sana (403d). 
This implies not only that intemperance produces bodily disease, but also 
that temperance produces bodily welfare, or at least makes the best of it 
(not a sufficient cause of bodily health). The idea is broached already and 
very emphatically in the Charmides 156b-157c, with a consciousness of its 
novelty. The concepts of health and disease in the Republic are influenced 
by Alcmaeon’s model of isonomia: disease, bodily or mental, is a state of 
imbalance and conflict. Correspondingly, health, bodily or mental, is a 
state of balance and harmony. Republic books viii and ix (until 576) offer 
a whole spectrum of pathological societies and individuals. These are the 
patients of the Platonic doctor, i.e., the Platonic philosopher. It is, in fact, 
a study of the health and happiness (or better: welfare) or lack of them in 
various degrees (544a). By this means we are supposed to get a clearer 
perspective on what constitutes health and happiness in the healthy in-
dividual. 
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Problems raised and solutions proposed: (1) Is the mind-body relation 
asymmetrical? What view of man lies behind? (2) Does ultimate health 
require knowledge of Forms? In that case it would only be obtainable by a 
few. (3) For Plato health and disease are dependent on the policies of the 
state: its programme of education and its whole organisation and ethos. 
Hence, reform in health care implies reform of society. Do Plato’s doubts 
about the realisability of his ideal state show in his hopes or otherwise 
for creating a healthy individual? Or is it enough to ground the state in 
one’s soul? (4) Finally, the unfailing sign of health would presumably be 
the ‘happiness’ (eudaimonia) of the individual. If so, why? Moreover, how 
happy/healthy would the inhabitants of the state be? Can all (classes) 
expect happiness/health in the same degree? How can we decide? These 
questions may be asked even when the state is only realised personally.
3. Eudaimonia in Plato’s Republic
The main motivation behind the Republic, it may be argued, is to create 
a happy community and to demonstrate that justice or morality (dikaio-
sune) leads to or is eudaimonia of the city. Hence, we must first sharpen 
our conceptual tools and look at the notion of eudaimonia. What did it 
mean to the Greeks and Plato, and how do we translate it? The answer 
is that eudaimonia generally connoted ‘material success’, ‘thriving’ and 
so on. For Plato, however, the term embraced spiritual well-being, happi-
ness. In view of the fact that Plato’s ideal state is a class society, it seems 
relevant when considering the happiness of the state to take a look at the 
happiness of the guardians, the auxiliaries (soldiers and police) and the 
working class (artisans) in turn. Now the message of the Republic is that 
happiness involves being moral, just. So the classes are happy to the ex-
tent they are just. But being just involves knowledge of the Good which is 
possessed fully only by the ruling class. The auxiliaries and notably the 
working class have to rely on the insight of the ruling philosophers. Hence 
they are by necessity less happy than their superiors, but still as happy 
as they could possibly be considering their mental equipment. The phi-
losophers or the guardians are the only ones capable of producing happi-
ness in everyone in the community (519e-20a). The happiness of the whole 
community just means the happiness of all the inhabitants, whereas the 
happiness of the individual is defined by its place within the community. 
I end by discussing critically in what sense a city based on state con-
trol from birth to death can meaningfully be said to be eudaimon. To us 
freedom is paramount, but to Plato we are free only to the extent that we 
are just, and the justice (morality) of, e.g., the working class is guaranteed 
by the rulers.
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4. Mental Health in Socrates and Plato 
We see an important development in the notion of health: from moral 
knowledge (early dialogues) via mental order (middle dialogues) to psy-
cho-physical harmony (late dialogues).
The Platonic dialogues give us a picture of logos in various forms as 
therapy of the mind. In the early dialogues the Socratic elenchus clears 
the soul of all ignorance (i.e., Socratic vice and illness) just as in the lat-
er dialogues the elenchus is the highest and principal katharsis (Soph. 
229d-230d and Laws 720de, cf. Phd. 65b-67c,). Also, mental health is mo-
rality throughout, from beginning to end (Crit. 47d, Rep. 444de, Soph. 
228e), and bodily health requires mental health (Charm. 156e f., Rep. 
403d).
However, there is an interesting development in the Corpus, apparent-
ly dependent on a different view of the irrational and man in general: an 
increasing awareness of the ineradicable influence of the body (medicine). 
Thus, in the early dialogues education seems to be directed mainly, if not 
exclusively, to the intellect, the means being refutation. Knowledge is the 
necessary and sufficient condition for virtue, while ignorance is the neces-
sary and sufficient condition for vice (Prot. 351b-357e). Although Socrates 
applies ‘charms’ and is an ‘enchanter’, his means are kaloi logoi, i.e., not 
irrational formulae, but rigorous argument (there are, admittedly, irra-
tional aspects to this such as appeals to shame, repetition of arguments, 
etc., but basically his procedure is an appeal to reason). By contrast, in 
the middle dialogues (beginning already in the Gorg. 505bc and on), we 
find mental health (and morality) understood as balance (on the model 
of Alcmaeon’s isonomia) and mental illness correspondingly as imbal-
ance and conflict rather than ignorance, and an educational programme 
including gymnastics and music, both in the service of mental training 
and character development. The unhealthy constitutions and unhealthy 
personalities, e.g., the tyrant of the Republic, are not only unhealthy but 
also immoral, in need of education. Today the notion of the ill as immoral 
(health as control over the passions) would be regarded as a primitive and 
outdated. Eventually, Plato grows more pessimistic about the possibili-
ties of mental, not to say intellectual, education, and resorts to rhetorical 
psychagogia (Phdr. 269d-272b) and even physical punishment in the end 
(Laws), in line with his nosology (Tim.). Thus, in the late dialogues we find 
the view of the immoral as also physically (not only mentally, as in the 
Republic) ill and the connected idea that diseases are psycho-somatic: ma-
nia and amathia are causally dependent on bodily states (Tim. and Phil.). 
Social conditioning and medication have now replaced teaching. This is a 
realization of the force of the body and the irrational, as well as being the 
predominant modern way of looking at the facts.
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The Timaeus
In the Timaeus the Forms are patterns (paradeigmata) but no longer ex-
clusive (monoeide). They are now seen as interrelated natural kinds and 
hence arguably no longer separate from the world. In this way they resem-
ble what we find in other late dialogues. The two-world picture is not what 
we get: there is one world generated by Forms and Place. It seems possible 
to interpret the Forms as numerical ratios somehow implicated in mat-
ter, generating its actual structures. This is what may be termed ‘cosmic 
matter’, generated by imposition of the mentioned ratios on ‘pre-cosmic 
matter’ or chaos. The latter is made up of a place-matrix characterised by 
irregular solids. Having no definite character, it cannot even be viewed as 
extension, a term better reserved for cosmic matter which is also regarded 
as full (without void) and finite. There is a problem about the motion of 
chaos, as motion in the later dialogues has its source in the soul. Instead 
of positing an irrational soul as responsible (not warranted by the text), it 
may be suggested that irrational precosmic motion is due to an irrational 
part of the world soul. It then has to be assumed that creation is a paed-
agogical ploy.
5. The role and status of the Forms in the Timaeus: paradigmatism re vi-
sit ed?
It is argued that the ontological-cosmological key-terms of the Timaeus 
relate to the late dialogues, and that the Forms, although viewed as para-
deigmata, are not affected by the critique of the Parmenides. Forms are no 
longer exclusive, but are interrelated natural kinds and hence (arguably) 
not separate from the world, at least in the sense of constituting another 
world: there is only this one world ‘generated’ by Forms and Space. But we 
may approach this one world either by thought or by the senses. Moreover, 
these Forms may be interpreted as sets of numerical ratios somehow im-
plicated in matter (i.e., as not entirely abstract), mirrored by actual struc-
tures in space. For instance, this dog here instantiates to our senses (mir-
rors) temporarily a unique intelligible paradigmatic set of numerical ra-
tios. Plato seems to be experimenting with the Forms in this late dialogue.
6. Plato’s concept of matter
Plato’s conception of matter may be summarised as follows: (a) there is 
an underlying place-matrix, existing independently of what may charac-
terise it. It is itself totally without any marks that might individuate it, 
but it supplies the place where diverse geometrical configurations appear. 
The figures that are found in the place-matrix in the precosmic state are 
irregular solids. These, when characterising the matrix, are transformed 
into physical entities or ‘powers’ that interact with their fellow powers in 
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a totally disorganised way. Such is ‘chaos’ or Platonic matter, that is, the 
materials that God or Divine mind takes over. It will be understood that it 
is a misconception to identify the place-matrix with extension. Extension 
is rather what we call ‘Platonic matter’, i.e., the product of the imposition 
of figures, of any kind, on the place-matrix. Moreover, the place-matrix is 
structured all over, no place is left empty: Plato does not believe in a void. 
It is also implied that structured place is finite. When cosmos is created 
no matter is left out. (b) Cosmic matter is precosmic matter arranged into 
four regular solids. These and their compounds and varieties are probably 
what the Phaedo and the Parmenides refer to by ‘the Forms in us’. They 
are not eternal, but may be broken down (Phd. 106 c). (c) As a third kind of 
matter we have empirical matter, i.e., tables, chairs, etc., as we experience 
them. This is a rather subjective form of matter that was adduced just for 
the sake of completeness.
The precise order of the individual dialogues is unknown. With one 
exception (the Timaeus), we have followed the chronology of W.D. Ross. 
There is not, however, much change in Plato’s views on matter. Rather 
there seems to be a shift in scope: from an idealistic obsession with per-
ceptual matter in the middle dialogues (the Phaedo, the Republic), to a 
more realistic acknowledgement of physical matter in the later dialogues.
7. Disorderly motion in the Timaeus
The problem is this: in the Phaedrus (245), in his argument for the im-
mortality of the soul, Plato had argued that the soul is ever in motion, a 
self-mover and first principle of motion for all other things. Again in the 
Laws (896) we find a similar doctrine when the essence of soul is defined 
as self-movement and the source of all movement. In other words, this is 
seemingly a well-established doctrine in the second part of the Platonic 
Corpus. Now the Timaeus offers an account of the coming into being of 
the world from a mixture and combination of necessity and intelligence. 
This is done by way of a description of a pre-cosmic chaos. If this is to be 
consistent with the doctrine outlined above of no-motion-without-soul, we 
are forced to assume a second and irrational world-soul as responsible for 
the pre-cosmic chaos. This escape, however, is not open as no such soul is 
mentioned in the Timaeus. Even not taking creation literary is no help. 
Perhaps, then, we ought to take the circle of the Different to stand for the 
irrational element in the world-soul. Plato has an account (37a-c) of the 
intellectual performances carried out by the circle of the Different: it is 
concerned with the sensible world and results in opinion and belief. In con-
trast to the circle of the Same concerned with the Forms and resulting in 
knowledge. Later on (51d), true belief is distinguished from knowledge by 
being irrational. With some qualifications, partly pointed out by Vlastos, 
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an analogy with the human soul can be drawn. It is to be noted in this 
connection that Plato lets his Demiurge form the immortal part (reason) 
of man from the ingredients left over from the creation of the world-soul 
(sic), but mixed slightly less well. Thus Plato allows for more irrationality 
in man in two ways: his reason 1) equals the world’s soul, and 2) is badly 
mixed.
Psychology
The later dialogues offer a new conception of the soul as a self-mover and 
a dunamis or kinesis. It is argued that self-motion involves tripartition (or 
partition one way or another), and that tripartition (or some other parti-
tion) in turn involves embodiment. A case in point is God in the Politicus 
myth. His motion is arguably physical rotation, with a possible non-phys-
ical aspect. In the Laws self-motion is not seen as occurring by itself, but 
as accommodating itself to and exhibiting itself within physical process-
es, a purposive physical motion among mechanical motions. The later 
dialogues agree that mind requires soul, which requires embodiment. 
However, mind and soul are not two different things, but mind is soul in 
the original and best condition (self-rotation). Another case is the soul in 
the Philebus. It is viewed in an almost Aristotelian way as the dynamic 
structure of the body. It confirms the conception of soul as a mathematical 
entity most explicit in the Timaeus. It is reminiscent of the harmony soul 
of Simmias and the weaver soul of Cebes in the Phaedo. But Plato does 
not take this line. He adds his own idealist twist, purposive reason, to the 
picture.
The Laws differs from earlier dialogues in its interest in the manage-
ment of irrational feelings by three means: conditioning (dance, rhythm, 
harmony and exposure to moral persons), self-integration (a more con-
scious training by exposure to intense emotions and dangers) and finally 
sublimation.
8. Self-motion, tripartition and embodiment
In the later dialogues the new conception of the soul as a self-mover co-
incides with its being characterised as a dunamis and kinesis, i.e., some-
thing that must be in something else. Hence self-motion seems to be (or 
at any rate to involve) bodily motion. Comparison of the tripartite soul of 
the Phaedrus and the Timaeus confirms that psychic partition has to do 
with embodiment, as in the Republic. However, in contrast to the Republic 
the soul is tripartite by constitution in the Phaedrus: it is necessarily em-
bodied. Self-motion requires tripartition, i.e., unsatisfiable bodily desire 
regulated by reason, supported by aggression, and tripartition in turn 
involves embodiment. Hence self-motion involves embodiment.
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9. The physicality of God in the Politicus myth and in the later dialogues
In this paper I argue that God in Plato’s later dialogues, especially the 
Politicus, is necessarily immanent and that God’s motion is physical 
motion, without thereby precluding the possibility that he may have a 
non-physical aspect. Hence, to avoid misunderstanding, I am not about to 
argue for the position (unlikely in Plato’s case) of physicalistic reduction-
ism. If his position must have a name, I suggest a kind of soft physicalism, 
not unlike the Aristotelian concept of enmattered forms (Aristotle’s theol-
ogy is another matter). 
It is commonly thought that self-motion is psychic (non-physical). If 
this is correct, it would threaten the picture offered here of the physicality 
of not only world-soul but also world-reason. However, in Laws X we get a 
fairly accurate account of self-motion in the classification of the ten possi-
ble motions (893b ff). Self-motion is here defined as what is permanently 
capable of moving both itself and other things in (κατά) or finding its place 
in (ἐναρμόττουσαν), all active and passive processes (894bc). If Plato felt 
that he transgressed categorial boundaries and thought of or had at the 
back of his mind the possibility of special psychic motions, then we are 
not told so. On the contrary, self-motion is pictured not as occurring by 
itself, but as ‘accommodating itself to and exhibiting itself within’ physical 
processes. The plain reading of this text suggests that of physical motions 
some are transmitted, some are self-moving. This is a distinction between 
mechanical and purposive physical motion. The latter is the soul’s own 
motion, but we should avoid thinking of it as non-physical. Following the 
logic rather than the surface meaning has led to the idea of a god (at 
least) tied to the physical (he must be immanent, but could be allowed a 
non-physical side). This reading was supported by texts from a series of 
dialogues belonging to the same period (Soph., Phil., Tim., Laws). They 
all agree that nothing can have mind without soul, and that soul must be 
embodied. Plato was not, if this is correct, a theist, but rather a panthe-
ist. Moreover, it has been argued that the two late-Platonic concepts, soul 
and reason, are not two different things. Rather the latter is soul in its 
best and original state (self-rotation). Hence Plato can both regard reason 
as requiring soul and as being basic in so far as it is never generated. 
Soul, on the other hand, can be said to be created, by reason. Where it is 
claimed to be ungenerated (Phaedrus), it is to be viewed as identical to 
reason (i.e., a reasonable soul). With this conceptual clarification we hope 
to have shown that as reason is soul (a kind of self-mover), and as soul in 
the later dialogues is necessarily embodied, it follows that reason in the 
late dialogues is necessarily embodied.
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10. The psychology of the Philebus 
The psychology of the Philebus is part of a general Platonic ontological 
framework, i.e., Forms, soul, reason, stuff, etc. This means that the con-
cept of soul in the Philebus is likely to develop if the other ingredients of 
that ontology have developed. The thesis defended here is that Plato’s view 
of the soul in the Philebus has become almost Aristotelian: it is viewed 
as the dynamic structure of the body. This fits in with a traditional 
conception of the four ontological ingredients: unlimited, limit, mixture 
and cause as precursors of the Aristotelian four causes. An organism is a 
right combination of stuff. On the face of it, we seem to be presented with 
a conception of soul as harmony of the body. The implication is that soul is 
always embodied. It may be objected that there are, e.g., special pains and 
pleasures belonging to the soul itself ‘apart from’ the body (32c4, 34c6). 
How can this be reconciled with a structure-soul intimately bound up 
with the body? 
I have to do mainly two things: (1) defend an interpretation of a key 
passage in Phil. 32a9-b4 against the background of the metaphysics of the 
dialogue, and (2) counter possible objections to this interpretation. 
The Philebus psychology is not unique but in line with other late dia-
logues such as Phaedrus, Sophist, Politicus, Timaeus and Laws. Moreover, 
it confirms a view of the soul as a mathematical entity most explicit in the 
Timaeus. The limit soul understood in the light of Timaeus as a mathe-
matical harmony of the body is reminiscent of both Simmias’ harmony 
soul and Cebes’ weaver soul. However, it is important to notice that Plato 
does not subscribe to either of these conceptions as they stand but crucial-
ly supplies his own idealist twist: reason. 
11. Sophrosune in the Laws: cultivation of feeling by conditioning, self-
control and sublimation
It is argued here that the Laws differs from earlier dialogues in the belief 
that desire can to some extent be moulded or conditioned, controlled or 
sublimated. By ‘desire’ in this connection is meant ‘basic physical desire’ 
for material goods such as drink, food, sex and the objects that promote 
the acquisition of such things. The resulting virtuous state resulting from 
the various ways in which desire, pleasure and pain are dealt with is so-
phrosune. I focus on these different ways in turn.
In the Laws basic physical desires can from an early age be ‘turned 
the right way’. Paideia is essential for full virtue to be achieved later and 
consists here in the discipline or correct formation of the feelings of pleas-
ure and pain. Education is then the initial acquisition of virtue by the 
child, when the feelings of pleasure and affection, pain and hatred are di-
rected in the right courses before it can understand the reason why. Later 
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when the child understands, its reason and emotions come to agree that it 
has been given the appropriate habits. Hence sophrosune develops into the 
full virtue which is the concord of reason and emotion (653b6), whereas 
education (the prerequisite) just is the correct formation of our feeling of 
pleasure and pain.
Another necessary condition of full sophrosune is self-control (en-
krateia). But self-control is also to some extent necessary to courage which 
needs to fight not only external enemies but also emotions (633c8-e6). 
Self-control first becomes relevant when reason has developed. Hence chil-
dren cannot exhibit self-control. They are at the mercy of their emotions 
and think they are right. Self-control is required because of a bad trait 
in our make-up which is in principle uneducable, thus leaving room for 
akrateia. Hence it is necessary to bar certain basic drives by fear, laws 
and force. What does this barring is the golden cord of reason, helped by 
educated aggression/shame and desire. 
There may be a third way of dealing with desire when reason has de-
veloped: rechannelling or sublimation (783a). It consists in canalizing the 
‘unhealthy instincts’ away from the supposed supreme pleasure toward 
the supreme good. Varieties hereof seem to be indulging in one, and ‘star-
vation’ of another element, i.e., of desire. However, it cannot be said that 
sublimation is to the fore in the Laws in the way it is in the Symposium, 
the Phaedrus and the Republic. 
In brief: In conditioning the impulse is redirected towards other, 
more proper objects, but not itself transformed. In self-control the bad 
impulse remains unaltered but is made less effective. Hence it differs from 
sublimation where the impulse is transformed. 
We conclude that the Laws demonstrates a growing awareness and 
interest on Plato’s part in finding effective ways of dealing with the irra-
tional emotions (especially desire), that there is a special focus on self-con-
trol and incontinence, and that the original contribution of the Laws is a 
rather sophisticated programme of conditioning, a kind of ‘persuasion’, in 
addition to compulsion and constraint.
Plato’s Development and How to Read Plato
It is somewhat trendy nowadays to deny or ignore that Plato develops. 
However, this is absurd in many ways, e.g. exegetically and psychological-
ly to take the most obvious obstacles. There are too many contradictions 
in the Corpus that cannot simply be explained away as ‘dialectical’, and it 
is inconceivable and extraordinary that a long philosophical career does 
not exhibit some development. It is another matter of some difficulty to 
determine such development. Plato’s late philosophy is in focus for the 
present author. Thus it is firstly argued, in opposition to G. Owen, that 
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the Timaeus is late from the formal point of literary criticism, its view of 
paradeigmata, the physical world, mathematical interest and psychology. 
Secondly, the Epinomis is examined on a number of topics and found to 
be genuine. Its message is that wisdom is astronomy and its foundation, 
scientific arithmetic. In other words, as we already knew from Aristotle, 
Plato Pythagorised in his old days. He was impressed by the science of his 
time and inspired the scientists.
Plato’s work is dialogical with many different characters apart from 
Socrates. But as Plato does not himself appear it becomes a problem: what 
are we to take as Plato’s views? Who is the mouthpiece of Plato? I suggest 
somewhat provocatively that everybody, i.e. every character, is Plato’s 
mouthpiece as he may be conceived as thinking aloud in his written 
dialogues. The dialogues are artistic wholes and the author’s message 
must be dealt with and interpreted accordingly. Not unlike Sophocles’ 
dramas. This is not to deny that there are recurrent points of view that 
thereby offer themselves as Platonic.
12. Plato’s development and the date of the Timaeus
There seems still to be widespread support for the heresy propounded by 
Owen in his famous 1953 article that the Timaeus is a late middle di-
alogue, antedating the so-called critical dialogues (the Parmenides, the 
Theaetetus, the Sophist, the Politicus and the Philebus). As this redating 
has deep repercussions in Platonic exegesis and is not only controversial 
but, in the present writer’s opinion, untenable, it ought to be subjected 
to detailed criticism. Cherniss has done much to defend the traditional 
dating, but he has not convinced as many as one would like. Moreover, 
he does not deal with all of Owen’s arguments. Hence, there is room for 
reopening the issue.
First, I deal with a formal aspect, that of literary criticism and its pos-
sible value for dating the dialogues. Next, παραδείγματα in the Parmenides 
and later dialogues are discussed. Third, the γένεσις-οὐσία antithesis is ex-
amined. Fourth, the mathematical character of the Timaeus is analysed 
and, finally, the psychology of the Timaeus is discussed and compared 
with that of other late dialogues.
The results are this: the Timaeus is late for a number of reasons. 
First, from a formal point of view, Socrates is not the speaker and the for-
eign speaker is prone to long monologue and to digression. Secondly, the 
Timaeus implies an advanced view of paradigms that is not reconcilable 
with the middle dialogues, not affected by the criticism of the Parmenides, 
and in line with the attempts at revision to be found in the late dialogues. 
Thirdly, the conception of the physical world (γένεσις) is much more pos-
itive than that of the middle dialogues and even the Cratylus and the 
HumanWisdom_book_250416.indd   35 4/25/2016   4:20:35 PM
